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ABSTRACT
Patent sales are an underappreciated means of monetizing patents. Recent blockbuster patent sales
indicate heightened demand for patent acquisitions. There is evidence that such patent sales
transfer patents to parties more skilled in patent enforcement, reducing litigation. Patent sales also
move capital to innovators, which enhance incentives to innovate. But crucially, C corporations do
not benefit from advantaged tax treatment. Efforts by other nations to encourage patent use and
sales by providing “patent box” preferential tax regimes may provide some guidance for remedying
this gap in the tax code.
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FOR SALE. PATENTS. NEVER USED: GAPS IN THE TAX CODE FOR PATENT
SALES
KHURRAM NAIK*
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2011, the so-called smartphone “patent wars” detonated an
atomic bomb.1 Anticipation had built-up over the fate of the treasure trove of patents
from a bankrupt company that once comprised a third of the value of the entire
Toronto Stock Exchange.2 The portfolio of patents included patents that claimed
cutting-edge 4G wireless technology, the next horizon for the smartphone industry.3
Google was considered the most interested bidder; its lack of a strong patent portfolio
covering smartphones was widely acknowledged as a major impediment to its mobile
ambitions.4
The ultimate victors called themselves the “Rockstar” consortium, a fair moniker
considering the consortium included such smartphone goliaths as Apple, Microsoft
and Research in Motion.5 The consortium paid a stunning $4.5 billion dollars, more
than five times Google’s “stalking horse” bid.6 It was the biggest patent auction ever.7
Weeks later, industry analysts were not completely surprised when Google agreed to
purchase Motorola Mobility for $12.5 billion dollars, Google’s largest purchase ever.8

* © Khurram Naik 2012. J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The John Marshall Law School. B.S.,
Biological Sciences, Carnegie Mellon University. Thanks to my loving wife Amber.
1 See David Drummond, When Patents Attack, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Aug. 3, 2011, 2:37 PM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/when-patents-attackandroid.htmlhttp://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/when-patents-attackandroid.htmlhttp://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/when-patents-attack-android.html;
see
also
Timothy Q. Delaney & Janet Pioli, Smartphone Patent Wars: It’s the Operating System, 2010
ASPATORE SPECIAL REP. 23 (2010) (“While patent suits are nothing new in technology driven
industries, the virulence in the smartphone industry stands out. In excess of twenty-five actions
were filed in this sector in the past three years.”).
2 The
Bigger
They
Come,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Jan.
15,
2009),
http://www.economist.com/node/12936533http://www.economist.com/node/12936533http://www.econ
omist.com/node/12936533.
3 Diane Bartz, U.S. to Approve Google’s Bid for Motorola: Sources, REUTERS (Feb. 9, 2012, 4:59
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/09/us-antitrust-telecoms-patentsidUSTRE8182GR20120209 .
4 Robert Cyran, A Patent Fever Over Smartphones, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2011, at B2.
5 Kit Chellel, Malev Liquidation, Nortel U.K. Unit, Danish Banks:
Bankruptcy, BUSINESS
WEEK (Feb. 14, 2012, 7:45 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-14/malev-liquidationnortel-u-k-unit-danish-banks-bankruptcy.htmlhttp://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-0214/malev-liquidation-nortel-u-k-unit-danish-banks-bankruptcy.html.
6 Cyran, supra note 4 (“When the gavel came down, a group including Apple and Microsoft, as
well as Ericsson, Research in Motion and others, walked off with the portfolio for an unexpected $4.5
billion.”).
7 Chellel, supra note 5 (describing the novelty of the auction).
8 Matt Richtel & Jenna Wortham, Motorola’s Identity Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, August 22, 2011, at
B1.
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Google acknowledged what many surmised: Google was interested in the substantial
patent portfolio Motorola Mobility had amassed.9
Blockbuster patent deals continue to rock the technology world. In April,
Microsoft agreed to pay AOL more than $1 billion dollars for patents related to
smartphones, almost doubling AOL’s market capitalization overnight.10 Within two
weeks, Facebook, recently sued by Yahoo for patent infringement, announced it
would pay $550 million for some of the patents Microsoft bought.11
The smartphone industry is famous for its highly litigious members; it seems
nearly every major tech industry company is moving into the smartphone sector and
suing nearly everyone.12 The discussion over the patent wars overwhelmingly focuses
on patent litigation as the route to monetizing the patents.13 Why is litigation so
prevalent in patent monetization?14 Part of the answer lies with the substantial
difficulties in selling and licensing patents.15 This comment discusses how the
current taxation scheme makes sales and licensing less attractive options for
monetizing patents, why patent sales ought to be promoted, and explores
recommendations to amend the tax code to encourage such sales.
Part I provides background for the reasons why some firms license or litigate in
light of their market activities and international scale. Part II explores the role taxes
on litigation damages, sales and licenses play in business decisions. Part III makes
recommendations to promote patent production and use by reducing taxes on patent
sales.

9 See id.
In its announcement of the planned purchase of Motorola Mobility, Google
emphasized its interest in the portfolio of over 17,000 patents. Id.
10 See Steve Lohr, Microsoft’s AOL Deal Intensifies Patent Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2012, at
B1.
11 See Dina Bass & Brian Womack, Facebook Paying $550 Million for Some of AOL’s Patents,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 23, 2012, 6:45 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-23/facebook-pays550-million-for-some-of-microsoft-s-aol-patents.html.
12 See Steve Lohr, A Bull Market in Tech Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2011, at B1.
13 See Papool S. Chaudhari & Reyes Bartolomei Brown, A Primer On Mobile Phone Patent
Litigation: Recent Developments And Practice Tips, 2010 ASPATORE SPECIAL REP. 23 (2010).
14 See Kyle Jensen, Counting Defendants in Patent Litigation, PATENTLY-O (Oct. 27, 2010, 4:52
AM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/10/guest-post-counting-defendants-in-patentlitigation.html. Although the number of patent litigation suits has not risen substantially in the
past ten years, the number of defendants to these suits has almost doubled since 2000. Id.
15 See Peter Detkin, Leveling The Playing Field, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 636, 640
(2007). Although between one third and one half of all issued patents go to small inventors, the
market for individual patent holders is highly inefficient. Patent licensing is far from standardized
and requires significant effort to bring both parties to agreement. Id.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. How Does Taxation of Patents Affect Business Decisions?
Intellectual property is more vital to business growth than ever.16 With
estimates that up to 80% of the value of major corporations derive from intellectual
property, economic growth and intellectual property monetization have become
virtually synonymous.17 Because taxation is a key input to business decision-making,
understanding the incentives the current tax system create for IP is essential to
stimulating innovation.18
A notable example of the importance of taxation considerations in business
comes from none other than Google’s $12.5 billion purchase of Motorola Mobility,
which accrued significant tax benefits for Google.19 Google will benefit from tax
deductions and credits for Motorola’s net operating losses and research and
development costs, with estimates of tax savings of one billion dollars immediately
and $700 million per year until 2019.20
Taxation of business assets has become an international matter. The mobility of
capital throughout international companies makes it inevitable that businesses will
select jurisdictions that facilitate businesses uses of intellectual property.21 The IRS
endorses this practice by allowing companies to perform transfer pricing, which
enables companies to move patents to low-tax jurisdictions.22 Google, famous for its
16 Adam Hemlock & Jennifer Wu, U.S. Antitrust Implications of Patent Licensing, 52 FED.
LAW. 39, 39 (2005) (“The global technology transfer market is estimated to be worth some $100
billion annually.”).
17 See
OCEAN
TOMO,
http://www.oceantomo.com/productsandservices/investments/indexes/ot300 (last visited Sept. 28,
2011) (providing an estimate that as recently as 1975 80% of the value of the companies in the S&P
500 resided in tangible assets; twenty five years later, this seems to have inverted).
18 Governmental Attempts to Stem The Rising Tide Of Corporate Tax Shelters, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2249, 2271 n.4 (2004) (“The marketplace rewards companies with lower effective tax rates than
their peers, creating a powerful competitive pressure for executives to manage tax liabilities
aggressively.”).
19 See Lynnley Browning & Nanette Byrnes, REUTERS (Aug. 31, 2011, 11:19 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/31/us-motorolamobility-google-taxidUSTRE77U1QX20110831 (“Google Inc.'s blockbuster acquisition of Motorola Mobility Holdings
Inc. will bring an unusual stable of tax and accounting benefits to the search-engine giant, already
one of Corporate America's most savvy users of such perks.”).
20 Id. (“These are deductions which Motorola Mobility has been unable to use because of a
faltering business that has failed to generate the revenue against which to offset them. The
deductions include those for research and development, tax losses in the United States and abroad,
and credits carried over.”).
21 See
Lynnley
Browning,
REUTERS
(Jul.
28,
2011,
12:46
PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/28/us-microsoft-tax-idUSTRE76R5AY20110728 (explaining
that although Microsoft is headquartered in the United States, it earned 68% of its income from
overseas. As a result of deductions and credits for these overseas activities, Microsoft pays an
effective tax rate of just 17.5%.).
22 Lynnley Browning & Nanette Byrnes, supra note 19.
Under IRS rules on transfer pricing, a legal and controversial financial maneuver
governing the prices companies charge their divisions and subsidiaries for goods
and services sold between them, Google could shift Motorola's patents to a low-tax
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tax strategies and low blended tax, also plans to make use of transfer pricing to
minimize the taxation of the patents it acquired in the purchase.23
B. Litigation, Licensing, or Sales?
The painful truth is that litigation can be an unattractive option for extracting
value from a patent.24 Litigation is expensive; a 2009 survey found the median cost of
an infringement suit with between $1 million and $25 million at stake is $2.5 million,
and more than twice this cost for stakes over $25 million.25 As if cost alone was an
insufficient deterrent, litigation is unpredictable and time consuming.26
Even successful litigants may not come out ahead because the remedies
available in litigation may not be very satisfying. Obtaining injunctive relief is more
challenging than ever in the wake of eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.27 Proving
monetary damages in light of the decimation of the default rule of a 25% “reasonable
royalty” will likely challenge firms to provide more rigor in valuing their injury.28
Non-practicing entities, which are responsible for a substantial growth in patent
infringement suits cannot value their injury based on actual damages because they
are not actual competitors.29
However, there are a number of reasons patent holders rely on litigation rather
than licensing, even though litigation is an intrinsically less accurate measure of the
value of a patent.30 Licensing efforts may cause potential licensees to seek a

Id.

jurisdiction. They would have to pay a fair price for their use, but tax experts
argue that upfront cost is often well worth the future tax savings. Google could
also use a cost-sharing agreement, a form of transfer pricing that governs the
development of new patents and technologies.

23 Id. (“Google could also use a cost-sharing agreement, a form of transfer pricing that governs
the development of new patents and technologies.”).
24 See Damon C. Andrews, Why Patentees Litigate, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 219, 226–
27 (2011). In addition to the cost of legal representation in litigation, the opportunity cost of time is
steep; one third of patent cases take more than three years to reach trial from when the case was
filed. The steep costs associated with patent litigation affects both plaintiffs and defendants. The
deterrence effect of litigation for plaintiffs is significant and encourages resolution of the patent
disputes outside of court.
25 Id. at 228.
26 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, Anticompetitive Settlement of
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2003) (“The median patent case that
goes to trial costs each side $1.5 million in legal fees, to say nothing of the costs to the company in
lost employee time and productivity.”).
27 See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
28 See Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that
the 25% default rule for calculating a reasonable royalty is “fundamentally flawed”).
29 See John R. Alison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The
Characteristics of the Most Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2009) (comparing
characteristics of patents that have been litigated most frequently to those litigated once and
proposing these are valuable patents); see also Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co.,
836 F.2d 1320, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (explaining the “general rule” that patentees who are
competitors are entitled to lost-profits damages).
30 See Rob Harrison, Valuing Patents and Litigation, IP FINANCE (Aug. 20, 2011, 9:41 PM),
http://ipfinance.blogspot.com/2011/01/adieu-25-rule-at-least-in-us-litigation.html. In light of the
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declaratory judgment, which can have devastating consequences for patent holders.31
Patent licensing revenue is taxed as ordinary income, and will not likely benefit from
any better tax treatment than infringement damages.32 The very premise of licensing
is based on the threat of litigation, which means that licensing decisions implicate
litigation decisions.
The geographic source of patent-derived revenues and consequent taxation also
affects patent monetization strategy. Business income taxation is premised upon the
location of business activities.33 This is the reason companies such as Google search
for low-tax jurisdictions to hold patents.34 Licensing activities are necessarily based
on the location of the licensor.35 This means businesses move their intellectual
property assets to low-tax jurisdiction or turn to litigation.36 Jurisdiction for
litigation is based on the location of the infringing activities and the defendant.
Although litigation gives patent owners the flexibility of a range of locations where
they can extract the value of the patent, patent owners may be subject to tax in that
location.37

demise of the default rule of a reasonable royalty of 25%, valuing a patent by litigation is even more
complicated. Actual licensing from market-based transactions may be useful to determine the value
of a given patent.
31 See Mark R. Vanegas, You Infringed My Patent, Now Wait Until I Sue You: The Federal
Circuit’s Decision in Avocent Huntsville Corp v. Aten International Co., 92 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 371, 383–84 (2010).
32 This is consistent with the taxation of other business assets. Capital assets that are rented
out by a company are treated as ordinary income. Selling businesses assets and meeting the other
statutory requirements entitles the taxpayer to capital gains. See Fawick v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 436 F.2d 655, 660 (6th Cir. 1971). Patent infringement damages are typically treated as
ordinary income. Kurlan v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 343 F.2d 625, 629–30 (2nd Cir. 1965).
33 Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Holding Intellectual Property, 39 GA. L. REV. 1155, 1174 (2005)
(“Under the business situs theory, intangibles acquire situs for taxation purposes if they have
become an integral part of local business.”).
34 Ashley B. Howard, Does The Internal Revenue Code Provide A Solution To A Common State
Taxation Problem? Proposing State Adoption Of § 367(D) To Tax Intangibles Holding Companies, 53
EMORY L.J. 561, 565 (2004) (“The relative ease of forming intangibles holding subsidiaries and the
significant tax benefits received by the parent corporation result in a very popular tax planning
structure.”).
35 See Nguyen, supra note 33, at 1188–89. The jurisdictional inquiry in an infringement cause
of action based on intellectual property is the connection between the infringing defendant and the
litigation forum, not the physical, substantial nexus between the intellectual property holder and
the forum. Additionally, the in personam jurisdictional inquiry is a due process inquiry, not a
Commerce Clause inquiry. It follows that if an out-of-state holder of intellectual property can obtain
jurisdiction over a defendant in a forum, that forum may not have a substantial nexus with the
intellectual property holder for state tax purposes.
36 Howard, supra note 35, at 563. (explaining how companies form intangible holding company
to hold intellectual property assets).
37 See Nguyen, supra note 33, at 1187–89.
The jurisdictional question in an infringement
action is whether there is long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant, not on the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s
residence and contacts with a forum state are not of jurisdictional significance. But even if a
plaintiff may claim damages in a particular jurisdiction, there may be a sufficient nexus exists to
allow that jurisdiction to tax these damages.
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C. The Advantages of Patent Sale—For Some
Patent sales have one key advantage over licensing and litigation: sales do not
depend upon proving past infringement by the purchaser.38 Sellers can get
immediate cash up-front for their patents, and add license-back provisions if the
seller wishes to continue to use the rights.39
Individual inventors have a key advantage over their major corporation
competitors when selling patents: unlike C corporations, individual inventors are
able to take advantage of a tax code that provides multiple options for obtaining more
favorable capital gains treatment rather than ordinary income for the sale of patent
assets.40
Until 2012, the highest tax bracket for long term capital gains was 15%.41 The
highest bracket for ordinary income for a corporation was 35%.42 In historical terms,
today’s capital gains tax is relatively low.43
The Internal Revenue Code (IRC) provides general capital gain sections, IRC
Sections 1221 and 1231.44 IRC Section 1221 excludes property held primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s trade or business.45 This can
exclude those taxpayers that are in the business of creating and selling intellectual
property.
Capital assets as defined in IRC Section 1221 also exclude depreciable property
used in a trade or business.46 These are covered by IRC Section 1231, provided the
property has been held longer than the applicable holding period.47 If it is held for
less than this required holding period, the gain and any payments are treated as
ordinary income.
In addition to these methods for reaching capital gain treatment, individual
professional inventors, are also eligible for capital gains treatment under IRC Section
1235.48 This statute was specifically enacted by Congress to provide individuals in
the business of producing intellectual property such as patents the ability to benefit
from lower capital gains treatment, rather than subject their income to ordinary
income tax.49 The benefit is substantial; the current difference between the top
bracket of ordinary income and long term capital gains tax is 20%.50
38 David Yurkerwich, Patent Sales and the IP Business Plan, in LICENSING IN THE BOARDROOM
2008: KEY LICENSING ISSUES FOR SENIOR EXECUTIVES, INTEL ASSET MGMT. 37, 37–38 (2008),
http://www.iam-magazine.com/issues/complete.ashx?g= 68bb21ce-9dc8-488c-98be-c4986ef63921.
39 Id.
40 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a)(2) (2012).
41 Effects Of Tax Rate Changes After Extensions To Bush Tax Cuts End, 13 BUS. ENTITIES 42,
43 (2011).
42 Id.
43 Nancy B. Nichols, William M. Vandenburgh & Luis Betancourt, Bone Up On The Various
Tax Planning Implications Of A Bear Market, 81 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 324, 327 (2008).
44 26 U.S.C. § 1221 (2012); id. at § 1231.
45 26 U.S.C. § 1221(a)(1).
46 Id. § 1221(a)(2).
47 Id. § 1231.
48 Id. § 1235.
49 See William A. Drennan, Changing Invention Economics By Encouraging Corporate
Inventors To Sell Patents, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1045, 1141–42 (2004). During the Conference
Committee debate, one justification offered emphasized the role the patent system had in the rapid
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This Congressional action to stimulate intellectual property sales falls short of
effectively stimulating intellectual property production because it does not provide
corporations the same opportunity to benefit from favorable tax treatment for patent
sales. This violates a fundamental principle of taxation: taxpayers in similar
situations should be taxed equally.51 IRC Section 1235 creates a distinction between
individuals and corporate entities engaging in the very same business.52
Providing some basic horizontal equity in providing capital gains tax is
important for increasing patent liquidity.53 Greater liquidity ensures more accurate
pricing for buyers and sellers; the rewards for selling patents make access to
individual patents easier.54 This reduces the transaction costs of finding valuable
patents and promotes efficient use of patents.
A solution for corporations that makes other uses of patents more attractive
than litigation is also desirable, especially if it rewards innovation.55 The United
Kingdom, among other nations, has enacted a “patent box” tax regime that provides
lower taxes for income attributable to patents produced in the U.K.56 Measures such
as these may provide the necessary incentive for corporations to produce patents and
innovate based on these rather than seek to litigate. The potential for these regimes
is explored in the Analysis.
II. ANALYSIS
Patent litigation is currently a more attractive means of monetizing patents
than is desirable. This section will analyze the effects of tax policy on business
decisions concerning the sale, licensure or litigation of their patents.

growth of the industrial economy, and the historical neglect of the individual inventor in
contributing to the patent system.
50 26 U.S.C. § 11(b) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 1(h). The current difference between the top ordinary
income tax bracket (35%) and the top long-term capital gains tax bracket (15%) is 20%.
51 See David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principal of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
43, 62–63 (1990) (suggesting that horizontal equity is rooted in the Constitution, because the
Fourteenth Amendment provides for equal protection under the law.); see also Brian Galle, Tax
Fairness, 65 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 1323, 1328 (2008) (“Horizontal equity ‘can be defended as an
essential feature of the revenue function of taxation.’”).
52 IRC 1235 has other limitations that narrow the scope of the benefit it offers. Only the
statutorily defined “holder” of the patent may benefit from the favorable capital gains treatment.
The holder is defined as the actual inventor. See 28 U.S.C. § 1235(a).
53 See Drennan, supra note 49 at 1148–49. Promoting patent sales by decreasing corporate
inventor’s tax liability may provide significant benefits for patent innovation. These include
improving economic efficiency, encouraging innovation by allowing firms to focus on their core
business, and moving capital to firms producing inventions.
54 See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity And Efficiency In Intellectual Property
Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 31–32 (2010). Potentially desirable transfer includes assignment to
private firms for commercial exploitation or donations to public charities.
55 Id. at 50.
56 See HM TREASURY, CONSULTATIONS & LEGISLATION, PATENT BOX, http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/consult_patent_box.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2011) (“The Patent Box will encourage
companies to locate the high-value jobs and activity associated with the development, manufacture
and exploitation of patents in the UK.”).
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A. Facilitating Patent Sales by Lowering Taxation Can Reduce Litigation.
Reducing taxes on patent sales will likely stimulate such sales.57 A recent
empirical study estimated that 13.5% of all patents are traded at least once.58
Measuring commercial importance by using patent citations reveals that highly cited
patents are traded substantially more.59 This suggests that more valuable patents in
fact get traded more, and sheds light on the robust mechanism for allocating patents
to those who value them most.60 Individual inventors and small corporations are the
most active sellers, selling 16.2% and 17.5% of their patents, respectively, while large
corporations sell just 10.5%.61
The scale of patent sales is modest compared to the scale of patent litigation and
licensing. The licensing market is estimated at $100 billion as of 2003.62 The median
damages for patent litigation in the telecom sector between 1995 and 2007 was $31.4
million.63 But the market in 2009 for patent sales was merely $1.2 billion.64
This may be because patent sales are complicated due to the difficulties in
patent valuation.65 Part of the difficulty arises in valuing individual patents because
firms often use bulk as a signal of the value of a patent portfolio.66 Taxing patent

57 See Drennan, supra note 49, at 1050–51. This claim derives from basic economic theory. In
short, if the marginal cost of production of goods claimed by the patent goes down, the price of the
product will go down, enhancing consumer welfare. Reducing taxes on capital gains produces this
effect by reducing the cost of acquisition. Reducing taxes on licensing will not have the same effect
unless the reduction in the taxes more than offsets any cost of licensing by producers.
58 Carlos J. Serrano, The Dynamics of the Transfer and Renewal of Patents, 41 RAND J. OF
ECON. 686, 686 (2010) (“As we show here, the market for patents is large. For instance, 13.5% of all
granted patents are traded at least once over their life cycle and this number is higher when
weighted by patent citations.”).
59 Id. at 692 (“Second, when we weight the rates of transfer by the importance of the patent, as
measured by patent citations received, the rates increase substantially, especially for small
innovators and individual owners (unassigned patents and private inventors).”).
60 Id. at 687 (“The contribution of our theory is to introduce the possibility of arrival of
opportunities for surplus-enhancing transfer, which may lead to alternative potential owners having
greater valuation for a patent than the current owner.”).
61 Id. at 692.
62 See Gary M. Hoffman, Licensing for Strategic Objectives, in HANDLING INTELL. PROP. ISSUES
IN BUS. TRANSACTIONS 2003, at 1061, 1066 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop.
Course, Handbook Ser. No. 740, 2003), available at WL, 740 PLI/Pat 1061. Revenue from licensing,
litigation and settlement of patent suits increased from $3 billion on 1980 to $100 billion in 2003..
63 See Anne Kelley, Practicing in the Patent Marketplace, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 115–16
(2011). Median damages in the software industry is $8.5 million.
64 Id.
65 See Aleksandar Nikolic, Securitization of Patents and its Continued Viability in Light of the
Current Economic Conditions, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 393, 412–14 (2009). The dominant
approaches to valuation are based on income stream, market value or cost of acquisition. Each
method may produce a different result, and even within a type of approach different values result
from the numerous assumptions required. Establishing market value for patents is particularly
challenging for new companies or determining the present value of future royalty income.
66 See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem And
its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 308 (2010) (“According to the infamous
“ruler” methodology, ‘you would bring your stack and you’d bring a ruler, and you’d put each stack
next to each other and you'd take a ruler and you measure the relative heights of the stack. And
some algorithm would tell you the number.’”). In sectors where cross-licensing is a popular means of
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sales as ordinary income only adds more friction to the sales and decreases interest
in purchasing patents.
Some commentators have raised concerns that making patents easier to acquire
will in fact promote litigation.67 This would be particularly likely if the sales are to
firms such as NPEs, with business models that emphasize litigation for profit.68
Indeed, there is reason to believe that NPEs already make up a larger percentage of
patent sales than before.69 It is also true that such firms’ primary business model
often depends upon litigation for profit.70 This leads many to conclude that the
current level of participation in the secondary market by NPEs has brought excessive
litigation.71 These NPEs end up merely extracting economic rents rather than
contributing to the net innovation in the nation.72 Some go so far as to suggest firms
selling patents ought “not [to] sell arms to terrorists” by selling to patent assertion
firms.73
However, notwithstanding the presence of such firms, litigation might be even
more prevalent without patent buyers. Another explanation for the current state of
the market is that firms have been slow to realize the importance of extracting value
from the extraordinary supply of IP now underlying commerce.74 With this in mind,
litigation could be even higher if market participants were interested in monetizing
patents but varied in their skill in enforcing patents.75
resolving disputes over patent boundaries, increasing patent portfolio size is a common means of
improving bargaining power.
67 See id. at 352.
68 Id. (“Because of this, some have called on companies “not [to] sell arms to terrorists,” that is,
to exclude patent-assertion entities from their patent sales.”(citing Matthew Fawcett & Jeremiah
Chan, March of the Trolls: Footsteps Getting Louder, 13 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 10 (2008))).
69 Kelley, supra note 63, at 188.
The bulk of the buying in the patent marketplace is by NPEs, which may be
thought of more broadly as ‘financial buyers.’ Sales to financial buyers represent
more than 60 percent of the total market value of all transactions and more than
75 percent of the transactions in the marketplace.
Id.
70 See Alison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 29, at 32 (“While they account for only about 16%
of the once-litigated patents, they represent over 80% of the suits filed involving the most-litigated
patents and own more than 50% of the most-litigated patents themselves.”).
71 See id. at 31. Patent reform debates often center on “patent trolls”.
72 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION, 2011 WL 838912, at *5 (2011). If a patent holder sues a practicing
entity, and the cost of switching technology is sufficiently high, the practicing entity may be find its
lowest cost choice is to pay the patent holder. The royalties obtained from the threat of injunction
capture not only the market value of the patented invention but also part of the costs that the
infringer would accrue to switch to a non-infringing substitute. This latter component is the “holdup” value of the patent. It can be argued that as a matter of policy, this hold–up value may be
overcompensation of the patentee’s injury. Such rent-seeking behavior is a deadweight loss to the
market, thereby inhibiting innovation.
73 See Fawcett & Chan, supra note 68, at 20. One perspective calls for companies to factor in
the “troll threat” into their relationships with patent transfer intermediaries and actively thwart
NPEs from obtaining their patents. If such actions is successfully coordinated among industries that
wish to minimize the impact of NPEs, this can cut off a major avenue of patent acquisitions for such
firms.
74 See Chien, supra note 66, at 302–08.
75 See Alberto Galasso, Mark Schankeran & Carlos J. Serrano, Trading and Enforcing Patent
Rights 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working paper No. 17637, 2011),
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There is some evidence that historically, patent transfers were motivated by
comparative advantages in marketing or product development.76 But today, an
empirical study suggests that market transfers may instead be best explained as
allocations to those most skilled at enforcing patents.77 Rather than increasing
litigation, patent market transfers have in fact reduced litigation.78 The empirical
study exploited the very lack of horizontal equity between individuals and corporate
patent owners to identify any endogenous effects of trade on litigation.79 Because
both licensing and litigation are taxed as ordinary income, tax considerations do not
lead firms to favor either source of income. But choosing between litigating and
selling patents will be affected by the capital gains treatment of patent sales.
The authors’ findings reveal that patent taxation has a significant impact on the
frequency of litigation.80 Crucially, sales from individuals to other individuals did not
reduce the likelihood of litigation of those patents, but sales to firms with larger
patent portfolios did. This is consistent with other evidence that firms that benefit
from economies of scale of patent enforcement actually reduce the incidence of
litigation.81
B. The Patent Box Movement Reflects the Importance of Taxes on Patent Production
and Use.
Perhaps the strongest endorsement of the importance of intellectual property
taxation considerations is found in the efforts by governments of high-GDP nations,
such as the United Kingdom, to encourage firms to develop and hold intellectual
property domestically. In 2009, the U.K. government announced it will offer a tax
break called a “patent box”.82 This followed similar measures such as those
implemented in the Netherlands and Luxembourg in 2007 and followed by Belgium

http://www.nber.org/papers/w17367. This may result if there are firms that seek defensive portfolios
in order to avoid litigation or if the acquiring firm has an economy of scale in enforcing patents.
76 See id. at 7. Traditionally, patent sales were viewed as beneficial where firms may benefit
from vertical specialization or comparative advantages in marketing or manufacture.
77 Id. at 3 (“Second, we find that changes in patent ownership reduce the likelihood of litigation
for patents originally owned by individual inventors, on average. This implies that enforcement
gains dominate commercialization gains (and the effects of any patent trolling activity) in the
market for such patents.”).
78 See id. at 1.
79 See id. at 2. To study the causal effect of trading on litigation, the authors exploited a
provision in U.S. tax law that enabled them to use variation in capital gains tax rates across states
and over time as a means of teasing out the effects of change in patent ownership on litigation.
80 See id. at 29. The impact on taxation in the authors’ study was used in part to find the
causal impact of patent trading on litigation. As they note, market-based allocations presumably
occur because they increase the surplus generated by the patented innovations. It follows then, if
patent sales are to be encouraged, providing capital gains taxation is of prime importance.
81 See id. at 6.
The authors also found that holding the buyer’s portfolio size constant,
litigation risk increased when the traded patent is a better fit in the buyer’s existing portfolio. This
is reflects the increased commercialization gains of such transfers.
82 See Rachel Griffith & Helen Miller, Patent Boxes: An Innovative Way to Race to the Bottom,
OX
(Jun.
30, 2011), http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/6706. The name “patent box” derives
V
from the “box” companies would elect to check off on their tax forms.
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and Spain in 2008.83 Unlike research and development credits, which directly
incentivize patent production, patent box regimes aim to promote use of patents in a
particular jurisdiction.84
These patent box regimes are direct responses to the increase in intellectual
property mobility and efforts by companies to move intellectual property assets to
tax-friendly jurisdictions.85 Although some nations provide similar measures for
other forms of intellectual property including trademarks and copyrights, the U.K. is
notably only providing tax incentives for patents, indicating that it is particularly
patents that provide economic growth.86
Providing low taxes for revenue derived from patents is crucial to the UK’s
patent scheme.87 Although other patent box providers have lower effective taxes, the
U.K. decided 10% taxes on revenues would provide a sufficiently strong incentive to
retain companies. The U.K.’s existing corporate tax rate is 26%, which is already
lower than the federal tax rate of 35% in the U.S.88 The U.K. patent box measure is
effective for patents first commercialized after November 29, 2010.89
The UK’s tax scheme will have some administrative costs to ensure fair
application. The UK’s tax scheme depends on attributing profits to patents. To do
so, it will provide a methodology for determining what percentage of a corporation’s
profits is attributable to the patents it owns.90 This includes determining a
hypothetical royalty rate to determine what the company would have to pay if the
company had to license the patent.91 The UK, like the Netherlands and Luxembourg,
include capital gains from sales of patents as eligible income.92 These provisions
reflect the importance these nations assign patent sales in facilitating innovation and
economic growth.
83 See HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, CORPORATE TAX REFORM: DELIVERING A
MORE
COMPETITIVE
SYSTEM
18
(2011),
available
at
http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/d/corporate_tax_event_slides.pdf. The motivation of various countries to initiate
these measures was to prevent offshoring of intellectual property assets.
84 JIM SHANAHAN, IS IT TIME FOR YOUR COUNTRY TO CONSIDER A “PATENT BOX”?, PWC'S
GLOBAL R&D TAX SYMPOSIUM ON DESIGNING A BLUEPRINT FOR REDUCING THE AFTER-TAX COST OF
GLOBAL
R&D
4
(2011),
available
at
http://download.pwc.com/ie/pubs/2011_is_it_time_for_your_country_to_consider_the_patent_box.pdf.
85 HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, supra note 83, at 13. The purpose of the patent
box is “[t]o enhance the competitiveness of the UK tax system, recognising that patents are mobile
and that multinational groups have a choice as to where to locate ownership and activity.”
86 HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, CONSULTATION ON THE PATENT BOX 22 (2011),
available at http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/consult_patent_box.pdf (“The Government is focusing
on patents because they have a particularly strong link to high- tech Research and Development
(R&D) and manufacturing activity.”).
87 Id. at 6 (“The regime should include both patent licence income and patent income embedded
in the sale proceeds of a patented product, in order to make the Patent Box competitive for the
widest range of businesses.”).
88 HM
REVENUES & CUSTOMS, RATES OF CORPORATION TAX (2011), available at
http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/corporate_tax/rates-of-tax.pdf.
89 See HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, supra note 86, at 7.
90 Id. at 19 (“Valuing individual patents using an arm’s length standard is likely to impose an
excessive administrative burden and the Government therefore intends to adopt a largely formulaic
approach.”).
91 Alison L. Maxwell, The UK Patent Box Proposal: How Does it Measure Up? (Jul. 27, 2011),
http://www.dlapiper.com/the-uk-patent-box-proposal-how-does-it-measure-up/ .
92 Id.
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C. The Patent Box Movement Supplies Missing Incentives in Patent Production and
Use.
The patent system is essentially a social contract designed to reward innovators
with exclusive rights when they provide full disclosure of the invention to the
public.93 The system awards patent holders with an exclusive right for a period of
time designed to capture the rewards for their efforts.94 But if inventors in fact are
unable to capture the benefit they produce, they will be underincentivized to produce
patents.
There are reasons to think patent holders are underincentivized. The research
and development of patents produce positive externalities.95 Economist William
Nordhaus identifies as “the alchemist fallacy” the notion innovators extract the full
private value of the social benefit of their contributions.96 In a 2005 study, Nordhaus
concluded that innovators only capture 4% of the social surplus from such
innovation.97
In the face of market failures such as these, policy makers can modify tax
regimes. The tax code may be modified to provide incentives to compensate for
market failures. For instance, because the U.S. recognizes that individual workers
obtaining more education collectively produce positive externalities, the government
provides subsidies and tax credits for certain education expenses.98 Because patentbased innovation produces similarly positive benefits, benefits only partially
captured by inventors in a free market system, tax incentives seem to be well-suited
to stimulate such innovation.
Patent box regimes provide a solution for such market failures. Research and
development credits help bring patents into fruition and minimize the risks in doing
so, but patent boxes take the crucial step of providing incentives to develop uses for
these patents.99 These are superior to general tax cuts in that they provide specific

Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945).
See Robert P. Greenspoon & Catherine M. Cottle, Don’t Assume a Can Opener: Confronting
Patent Economic Theories with Licensing and Enforcement Reality, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
194, 197 (2011). Although there are varying reasons offered for the underlying mechanism that
motivates inventors to seek patents, what is common to them is that individuals or entities are
wealth-seeking rational actors.
95 ROBERT D. ATKINSON & SCOTT ANDES, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., PATENT
BOXES: INNOVATION IN TAX POLICY 4 (2011), available at http://www.itif.org/files/2011-patent-boxfinal.pdf.
96 William D. Nordhaus, Schumpeterian Profits and the Alchemist Fallacy 4 (Yale Working
Papers on Economic Applications and Policy, Discussion Paper No. 6, 2005),
http://www.econ.yale.edu/ddp/ddp00/ddp0006.pdf.
97 Id. at 17.
98 Elkins, supra note 51, at 48.
99 See ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 95, at 7. Research and development (R&D) tax credits
are effective direct stimulants of innovation because they offset the cost of research activities and
reduce the risk to firms for engaging in such costly experiments. Patent boxes have a similar effect
by a different mechanism; instead of reducing the cost of R&D, they increase the payoff to successful
experiments. Such measures make investments in innovation attractive, particularly in early-stage
companies.
93
94
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incentives to innovate.100 A company that can earn a million dollars from refining an
existing product or developing a new innovation should be indifferent between the
two. But if in developing the new innovation the firm benefits from lower taxes, the
company now has incentive to innovate.101 This brings innovators closer to being
sufficiently incentivized to innovate, and the social benefits are substantial.
D. An Incomplete Tax Code.
A tax code is designed for a number of goals, including ease of administration,
horizontal equity, and economic efficiency.102 But even factoring in these constraints,
the current tax code falls short by providing only limited means of rewarding patent
innovation.
IRC Section 1235 rewards individual inventors with capital gains treatment of
sales but does not provide C corporations the same benefit, underincentivizing crucial
market participants.103 The provision is relatively strict in what patent transfers
qualify, and applies only to a transfer of “all substantial rights” to a patent, which
precludes, for instance, geographic limitations on use of the patent.104 Finally, it is
only available to the statutorily defined “holder” of the patent, which must be an
individual.105 Provisions such as IRC Section 1235 focus exclusively on rewarding
transferors. But the tax code does not provide incentives for acquirers of patents;
these parties are subject to a number of depreciation rules that so vary they may
fairly be described as irrational.
III. PROPOSAL
There is strong evidence that taxation is a significant factor in the decision to
license, sell or litigate patents. To the extent that patent litigation is currently more
common than desirable, measures that make patent sales more attractive means of
monetizing patents are desirable. At the same time, there is considerable interest in
finding measures to stimulate the economy. Policymakers have expressed an

100 See HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, supra note 83, at 17. The U.K.
Government, for instance, was concerned that general reductions in corporate tax would be too
expensive.
101 See ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 95, at 7.
102 See Nguyen & Maine, supra note 54, at 3–7 (Discussing the tradeoffs and the relationship
between these motives.).
103 See 26 U.S.C § 1221 (2012).
Patents must be capital assets to qualify for preferential
capital gains treatment. Patents held by corporations are likely characterized as inventory and
therefore excluded from the definition of capital assets.
104 See, e.g., Kueneman v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 628 F.2d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 1980). To
qualify for capital gains treatment, patent holder’s monopoly right to make, use, and sell the
patented invention throughout the United States during life of the patent and right to exclude
others from doing so must be transferred and, in context of a geographical transfer, it must include
all areas of the United States in which the patented invention has potential value.
105 See 26 U.S.C § 1235.

[11:859 2012]

For Sale. Patents. Never Used:
Gaps In the Tax Code for Patent Sales

873

interest in incentivizing patent production and concomitant business innovation.106 It
may be that both goals may be effectuated by the same modification to the tax
code.107
A. Corporations Should be Eligible for Capital Gains Taxation on Patent Sales.
Congress should take note that the same motivations to encourage capital flows
to innovators that led to granting individual patent owners with capital gains
treatment for patent sales under IRC Section 1235 applies to C corporations. It
seems there is demand from the market for such a change.108 If the most valuable
patents are those that are most likely to be sold, this suggests that patents are not
necessarily best used by the original inventors. As a society, we collectively benefit
when those who value patents most are able to obtain them, and use these patents to
develop new products109. The gap in patent sales between individual inventors and C
corporations suggests that there are at least some differences in the calculus of
selling patents between these groups. The ability to benefit from capital gains
taxation is a likely source of friction.110
One objection to the plan to decrease impediments to patent sales is that NPEs
may acquire patents more easily, resulting in an increase in litigation. Following
implementation of such a tax incentive, it can be reevaluated by Congress to see if it
is producing the intended effect of stimulating patent innovation. Ultimately,
Congress is charged with selecting policies that promote innovation111. Encouraging
106 See L. Gordon Crovitz, We Need an Immigration Stimulus, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2009, at
A13. In advocating for reform to make immigration to the United States easier, one commentator
observed the outsized effect immigrants have in producing intellectual property that builds
business. Multibillion companies founded by immigrants include Yahoo, eBay and Google. Half of
Silicon Valley start-ups were founded by immigrants, an increase from 25% a decade ago, and
started 25% of all venture capital-backed firms. Immigrants employ 450,000 workers in the U.S. A
recent study commission by the Kaufmann Foundation found that immigrants are 50% more likely
to start businesses than other Americans.
107 See ATKINSON & ANDES, supra note 95, at 4. Many neoclassical economists would express
disfavor at using the tax code to incentive certain business activities, relying on their efforts to point
to the benefit of markets in increasing collective well-being. But other economists support such
measures with their own body of research pointing that companies do not capture the whole benefit
of the research they conduct, leaving them underincentivized to produce valuable research.
108 The
liquidity
of
innovation,
THE
ECONOMIST
(OCT.
20,
2005),
http://www.economist.com/node/5015365.
109 A
market
for
ideas,
THE
ECONOMIST
(OCT.
20,
2005),
http://www.economist.com/node/5014990. The value of creating mechanisms to enhance liquidity to
allocate patent rights by licensing and sales is comparable to the development of the banking and
insurance industries.
110 See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Acquiring Innovation, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 775,
810–11 (2008). An additional gap in the tax code that may favor the increase in patent sales is the
lack of tax incentives for acquisition of intellectual property. As firms specialize and the market
segments development of particularized intellectual property, firms more than ever seek to acquire
intellectual property developed by other firms to create innovative products they could not otherwise
have otherwise. Deductions to individual and corporate inventors for capitalized development costs
are only available to developers of the intellectual property itself.
111 See James F. McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function
of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 221–23 (2006). Arguably, patent market
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patent licensing by offering taxes comparable to the current capital gains would
make sales, another route to monetizing patents other than litigation112.
B. The United States Should Introduce Its Own Patent Box Taxation Scheme to
Provide Incentives for Innovative Uses of Patents.
Intellectual capital is the lifeblood of the modern corporation113. A substantial
concern at a time when the economy is particularly weak is that such capital will
move to lower-taxed jurisdictions. A patent box scheme provides companies that
innovate and produce economic growth the proper incentives to develop intellectual
capital domestically.
Although a number of other nations have implemented patent boxes, the United
States can improve upon these earlier efforts. The time is certainly imminent. The
prime importance of patent litigation, licensing and sales to fast-growing areas such
as telecom and mobile telephony is the bellwether for the role patents will play in
such an economy. If firms have been slow to recognize the value of intellectual
property assets, the law has been even slower to respond to this demand.114
Selecting an appropriate level of taxation for a patent box scheme is necessarily
complicated because it implicates the intersection of policies behind taxation and
granting intellectual property. Nevertheless, some basic suggestions are offered here
for implementing such a scheme in the U.S.
The U.S. must compete with other nations, particularly those of similar
economic profiles such as the U.K. Corporate taxation is starkly different in the U.K.
and the U.S.; the U.S. has almost 10% higher corporate income taxes, not even
including state income tax. A 10% patent box tax on income derived from intellectual
property such as the U.K. will implement would make the U.S. competitive on an
international scale.115 In a nation such as the U.S. that taxes global income
domestically, a patent box scheme provides the ideal incentives to retain and
innovate using intellectual property domestically.116
participants such as NPEs operate in furtherance of the Constitution. Since the Patent clause is
Article I, Section 8 calls for Congress to “promote the progress” of “useful arts”, but the term
progress is not self-defining.
112 The government will need to explore what rate balances the need for tax revenue with the
goal of fostering growth, and can look to other nation’s tax regimes. HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE
& CUSTOMS, supra note 83, at 18 (“The Government wants to provide an effective incentive to create
and retain patents in the UK but believes it is not necessary to match the rates offered by other
countries. A 10% rate strikes a good balance between affordability and competitiveness.”).
113 See Jay Yarow, HTC Pays Microsoft $5 Per Android Phone, Says Citi, BUSINESS INSIDER
(May 27, 2011, 8:59 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/htc-pays-microsoft-5-per-android-phone2011-5. For instance, controlling patents for products used in a wide range of products can have
enormous benefits. Microsoft reportedly earns $5 per HTC Android based device, which translates
to billions of dollars in royalties.
114 HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, supra note 86, at 22 (“This restriction will also
apply where any other associated company acquires the trade or assets of the company which has
previously opted out of the Patent Box.”).
115 HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, supra note 83, at 18.
116 See David Kocieniewski, U.S. Business Has High Tax Rates But Pays Less, N.Y. TIMES, May
2, 2011, at A1. The United States is unique in trying to tax multinational corporations on their
foreign earnings, but it enables these same companies to avoid these taxes indefinitely by keeping
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Some features of the U.K. patent box reveal the particular challenges associated
with implementing a patent box here. The U.K. government must determine what
portion of profits derived from the sale of products is attributable to any underlying
patents. Such valuation raises obvious challenges. But HM Treasury provides a
formulaic approach that reduces the administrative burden of asking companies to
develop arms-length valuations and in turn have the government review these. But
due to the costs of providing this valuation, the patent box is an opt-in scheme in the
U.K; in order to avoid gaming the system, the U.K. does not allow companies to opt in
for five years if they opt out.117
The United States may also wish to avoid the high transaction costs associated
with such calculations by providing flat percentages with presumptive attributable
profits. But it may be best to leave companies to supply their own proof of revenues
attributable to patents and determine if it is worth the effort.
Tax considerations are very important, and often crucial determinants in
making business decisions about where to exploit patents and create jobs.118 Global
competitiveness in tax efficiency increases pressure on corporate officers to seek the
best global places to develop and house their intellectual property.119 Inevitably, any
changes in policy must be evaluated for their equity, to avoid creating loopholes and
opportunities for regulatory capture.120 HM Treasury developed an incremental
public consultation that made the goals of the patent box scheme clear and solicited
proposals on implementing the framework.121 Likewise, the U.S. has the opportunity
to ensure open discussion on the merits and means of accomplishing such a tax
system.
profits overseas. This encourages companies to use creative accounting to allocate profits to low-tax
jurisdictions and continue to invest these profits out of the United States.
117 HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, supra note 86, at 22 (“This restriction will also
apply where any other associated company acquires the trade or assets of the company which has
previously opted out of the Patent Box.”).
118 The Impact of International Tax Reform on U.S. Competitiveness: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 109th Cong. 20–32 (2006)
(statement of Craig R. Barrett, Ph.D., Chairman of the Board, Intel Corp., Santa Clara, California).
Then-CEO of Intel Craig Barrett testified to Congress in 2006 on the effect of tax considerations on
capital intensive industries such as the semiconductor industry.
As a result of this change in the competitive environment, a critical issue we must
now consider when deciding where to locate a new wafer fabrication plant is that
it costs $1 billion dollars more to build, equip, and operate a factory in the U.S.
than it does outside the U.S. The largest portion of this cost difference is
attributable to taxes.
Id.
119 See Griffith & Miller, supra note 82. One principal issue is that firms can allocate income to
offshore entities in lower-tax jurisdictions, which erodes the tax base for the domestic government.
120 See generally, C. Scott Hemphill, Paying For Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement As A
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553 (2006). When large firms seek to ensure
challenges for new entrants to maintain profits, such firms can quickly find regulatory bodies their
friends rather than enemies. By embracing and influencing such agencies, they can develop anticompetitive policies. This is the essence of regulatory capture. By exercising patent protection, such
industries can facilitate such exclusion. One notorious example is the “pay-for-delay” patent
litigation settlements in the pharmaceutical industry. There, patent holding drug companies have
paid generic manufacturers to delay entering the market, to the tune of billions of dollars.
121 HM TREASURY & HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, supra note 86, at 8 (identifying a three-stage
procedure for accepting comments from the public on a patent box tax scheme).
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An advantage of implementing a tax that lowers the cost of sales makes it easier
for firms to choose corporate structure. In an era where market segmentation has
grown with specialization, firms need the flexibility to choose to vertically integrate
or specialize as needed.122 Firms choosing to specialize and benefit from capital gains
taxation in selling patents will free up capital that can be used to reinvest in more
specialized innovation.123
IV. CONCLUSION
Patent litigation is a common but expensive and unpredictable means of
monetizing patents.124 The lack of a growth-oriented tax code for patent sales makes
litigation more attractive than desirable. Moving patent assets to those who value
them most would reduce litigation rather than increase it, and encourage innovation
that creates economic growth.125 Congress should provide the same capital gains tax
provided to corporate owners as is available under IRC Section 1235. An ideal means
of implementing this change is through the creation of a patent box tax regime,
which would offer low tax on income derived from patent uses.

122 See Drennan, supra note 49, at 1159–60 (discussing the economics of production and
whether reducing taxes impacts economic efficiency). Since a patent grants an exclusive right for a
particular invention, this necessarily raises the price of production of that product by disabling
competition. But if that right is reallocated to an entity that can innovate and develop products at a
lower cost than the current patent holder, the public as a whole benefits. If firms vary in their skill
and desire to focus on production, patents may be efficiently allocated to the party that has the
lowest production costs by a market. Facilitating these market transactions by lowering taxes
benefits the public.
123 See id. at 1160. When Thomas Edison was 22, he developed an improvement on the “ticker”
machine used in the financial industry. Edison could have made the business decision to develop
this market and license the product. Instead, he sold the machine for $40,000 and reinvested that
substantial capital into the Menlo Park research complex, where the light bulb, phonograph, motion
pictures and myriad other inventions developed. Reinvesting capital to focus on innovation can
have dramatic effects, with positive spillover effects for the public.
124 See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of Claim Construction
Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts and the International Trade
Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1701 (2009). Because of recent Supreme Court
decisions, district court judges claim constructions are subject to de novo review. Federal district
court judges often have limited backgrounds and expertise in patent law. Consequentially, their
efforts at claim construction suffer from high reversal rates from the Court of the Federal Circuit.
125 See Drennan, supra note 49, at 1148–49. Although it may seem at first that reducing taxes
on patent sales may reduce total tax revenue from patent sales, if aggregate sales significantly
increase, total revenue may in fact increase. Further, if the patents are allocated to producers with
lower costs and thereby are able to provide lower costs to purchasers, concomitant increases in sales
of the products will increase tax revenue.

